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Abstract 
This paper argues that the predominant economic theories of the firm neglect the importance of 
cooperation based on trust and loyalty, and that as a result, their criticisms of worker cooperatives 
are incomplete. While competence-based theories tend to focus exclusively on coordination and 
thus fail to acknowledge that the development and application of productive knowledge also 
involves cooperation, contract-based theories cling to a rigid model of behaviour that does not 
account for the type of cooperation thus involved. Thus, although contract-based theories denigrate 
cooperatives for failing to achieve cooperation, cooperatives may in fact be more propitiously 
situated than conventional firms to achieve the cooperation involved in the development and 
application of productive knowledge. Meanwhile, although competence-based theories imply that 
cooperatives are incapable of achieving coordination, cooperatives may in fact be more propitiously 
situated than conventional firms to achieve coordination without incurring potentially adverse 
effects on cooperation. This ability, however, may be suppressed by a hostile institutional 
environment, which biases both the options available to individuals and the way they perceive those 
options against cooperatives. Although inter-cooperative associations can alleviate this institutional 
bias, they involve structural and cultural obstacles of their own. 
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1. Introduction 
Despite the firm’s central role in society and the economy, there is little consensus regarding 
its purpose, function, and nature. While contract-based theories conceive the firm as an arena of 
exchange that purports to minimise transaction costs by achieving cooperation, competence-based 
theories conceive the firm as an arena of production that purports to develop productive capabilities 
by achieving coordination. These rival schools appear irreconcilable, with attempts to bridge them 
tending to treat one as subsidiary to the other (e.g. Langlois, 1992; Riordan and Williamson, 19851). 
Nevertheless, a common implication of both schools is that cooperative firms are generally 
inefficient. 
 This paper will firstly argue that both schools overlook the importance of cooperation based 
on trust and loyalty. Although competence-based theories are correct that the firm’s purpose is to 
develop and apply productive knowledge rather than to minimise transaction costs, they overlook 
the cooperation involved in fulfilling that purpose by focusing exclusively on the function of 
coordination. Meanwhile, although contract-based theories focus on the function of cooperation, 
they cling to a rigid, individualistic model of behaviour that does not account for the cooperation 
based on trust and loyalty that is involved in the development and application of productive 
knowledge. By combining insights from a range of disciplines, the paper will further propose a 
‘social’ theory of the firm in which this ‘deep-level cooperation’, and the solidaristic behaviour on 
which it is predicated, take centre stage. A crucial feature of the theory is that, through their adverse 
effects on behaviour, the bureaucratic organisational structures required for coordination may 
jeopardise deep-level cooperation. Although an appropriate organisational culture can alleviate this 
trade-off, it must still be substantiated in organisational structures, giving rise to distributive issues. 
The paper will secondly show that this social theory of the firm challenges the dismissal of 
worker cooperatives2 by the predominant theories. Far from failing to achieve cooperation, as 
alleged by contract-based theories, cooperatives may in fact be more favourably situated to achieve 
an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation than conventional firms, in which the 
organisational structures thus required are likely to threaten power-holders. Furthermore, far from 
failing to achieve coordination, as implied by competence-based theories, cooperatives may in fact 
be more favourably situated than conventional firms to implement the bureaucratic organisational 
structures that may be required for coordination (namely complex divisions of labour and 
hierarchical management systems) without compromising deep-level cooperation, because worker 
control can counteract their adverse behavioural effects. However, this ability may be suppressed by 
a hostile institutional environment, which biases both the options that individuals face and the way 
they perceive those options against cooperatives. Inter-cooperative associations can resist this 
institutional bias, but face their own structural and cultural obstacles. 
The argument that worker cooperatives may be able to implement complex divisions of 
labour and hierarchical management systems on more favourable terms than conventional firms is 
similar to Valentinov’s (2007) argument that agricultural cooperatives are capable of garnering the 
                                                          
1
 Some notable exceptions include Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1996; Nooteboom 1992, 2009. 
2
 I henceforth refer to worker cooperatives as simply ‘cooperatives’ or ‘cooperative firms’. In this regard, it is 
important to note that there are in fact a diversity of other types of cooperative (consumer, financial, etc.), 
which, although perhaps relevant, are not the subject of this paper. 
benefits of family-based farms in terms of trust and loyalty whilst also achieving the economies of 
scale (which can be conceived as a function of coordination) foregone by those farms. It is, 
moreover, especially relevant to developing countries: even if advanced economies are shifting (or 
have already shifted) away from Taylorism and Fordism, industrialisation has historically held the key 
to economic development3 (Reinert, 2007). 
 
2. Towards a Social Theory of the Firm 
2.1. The (Economic) Purpose of the Firm 
Following Ronald Coase’s seminal 1937 article, contract-based theories maintain that the 
purpose of the firm is to minimise the “transaction costs” of market exchange, which pertain to the 
opportunistic behaviour resulting from asymmetric information (e.g. Alchian and Demsetz 1972; 
Williamson, 1975, 1985)4. The firm fulfils this purpose by optimally allocating and enforcing rights 
over output or decisions that are otherwise non-contractible, thus achieving cooperation. In 
contrast, competence-based theories maintain that the purpose of the firm is to develop “dynamic 
capabilities”, which denote the capacity for learning and innovation (e.g. Teece, 1982; Penrose, 
1959; Nelson and Winter, 1982). The firm fulfils this purpose by productively combining skills and 
resources, thus achieving coordination. 
Which of these accounts is accurate? On the one hand, Williamson (1985, Chapter 9) has 
astutely pointed out that Adam Smith’s (1776) theory of the division of labour (which, according to 
Langlois and Foss [1999] and Foss [1997], is the foundation of contemporary competence-based 
theories) does not provide a sound answer to the question that Coase famously posed in 1937 – 
namely, why production is integrated within a firm rather than performed over the market5. 
Contract-based theories attempt to answer this question, and thus offer a coherent explanation for 
the purpose of the firm that is supposedly lacking in competence-based theories, by invoking the 
cooperation problems associated with asymmetric information and the contractual means of 
overcoming them. By thus focusing on asymmetric yet hypothetically tradable information6, 
however, contract-based theories envisage the firm to be a mere constellation of market-like 
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 There are sound theoretical reasons that explain this empirical fact relating to the unique characteristics of 
manufacturing that are lacking in, say, commodities and (most) services. These include: increasing returns; 
scope for synergies and technological upgrading; production for exports and thus foreign exchange; the 
tendency for increases in productivity to be translated into higher wages rather than lower prices; the ability 
to absorb low-productivity labour from the rural sector; and so on. 
4
 Not all contract-based theories of the firm explicitly appeal to transaction costs. However, they can all be 
interpreted in the transaction-cost framework, because they are all concerned with addressing the 
constraining the opportunistic behaviour that results from asymmetric information, whether in terms of 
workers free-riding on each other’s effort (e.g. Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) or investment partners making 
unproductively strategic investment decisions (e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). Indeed, 
as Dahlman (1979: 148) argues, all incentive problems – and therefore all transaction costs – can be reduced 
to matters of imperfect, and especially asymmetric, information. 
5
 Another way of phrasing this question is: why do workers sign employment contracts, which allow employers 
to control the workplace, rather than sell their labour (or its fruits) as independent contractors (or merchants)? 
6
 It was Coase (1937: 92), after all, who claimed that “[w]e can imagine a system where all advice or knowledge 
was bought as required”. 
exchanges (a “nexus of contracts”7; e.g. Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), or at least fail to explain why it 
should be anything more than that (e.g. Williamson, 1975; see Hodgson, 1999: 205). This 
reductionist definition, despite being inconsistent with the activities of real-life businesses8, in fact 
sidesteps Coase’s question – the very question that Williamson posed to Adam Smith – by 
maintaining that there is in fact no such as thing as the firm, at least in the sense of an institution 
that is qualitatively different from the market.  
By contrast, competence-based theories focus on productive knowledge, which is often tacit, 
embedded in groups and practical settings, or not fully developed, and therefore not tradable even 
in principle (Knight, 1921; Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982, 1986). Indeed, according to competence-
based theories, the non-tradability of productive knowledge is precisely why it must be harnessed 
within the collective organisation of the firm, rather than through market-like exchange – it is “the 
very essence of capabilities/competences” (Teece and Pisano, 1994: 540). The firm is thus afforded 
‘emergent properties’, because the productive knowledge developed and applied by the 
combination of individuals cannot be reduced to the knowledge of those individuals (Winter, 1982: 
76, 1988: 170; Dosi and Marengo, 1994; Kogut and Zander, 1992: 384).  
 
2.2. The (Social) Function of the Firm 
Although competence-based theories are therefore correct that the purpose of the firm is to 
develop and apply productive knowledge, they have not provided an adequate account of precisely 
how that purpose is fulfilled. In particular, by focusing primarily on the function of coordination, they 
fail to sufficiently heed the fact that the development and application of productive knowledge – 
especially the non-tradable forms of productive knowledge with which they are concerned – also 
requires cooperation9 (Polanyi, 1958, 1966; Nooteboom, 2009; Osterloh and Frey, 2000). Thus, while 
stating that competence-based theories surpass their contract-based counterparts by acknowledging 
that “the competence underlying productive, allocative and strategic decisions is tacit and generated 
through experience of particularity and idiosyncrasy, particularly in social settings”, Foss (1993: 134, 
emphasis added) goes on to acknowledge that it is precisely “the social component of the 
competences of the firm” that is undeveloped in competence-based theories. As a result of this 
neglect, the competence-based definition of the firm collapses into a mere “pool of intangible 
resources” (Penrose, 1959) or a “repository of productive knowledge” (Winter, 1988) – a ‘black box’ 
of learning and innovation that fails to improve on the reductionist definition offered by contract-
based theories. 
Contract-based theories focus on the function of cooperation, but assume that behaviour is 
universally characterised by market-like transactions between instrumentally-motivated 
                                                          
7
 This phrase is found throughout contract-based theories, including Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 311; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983: 322; Fama, 1980; Hart, 1989: 1763-5; Moore, 1992; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 777-8. 
8
 See Cohendet and Llerena, 2005; Walker and Weber, 1984; Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Jacobides and 
Winter, 2005: 400; Argyres and Liebeskind, 1999; Argyres and Mayer, 2004; Madhok, 2002. See Carter and 
Hodgson, 2006 for a review of these studies. 
9
 Nelson and Winter (1982) attempt to integrate cooperation into their concept of routines, which serve to not 
only coordinate production but also to establish a “truce” between different members of the firm. However, 
exactly how relationships are governed is not spelled out. See Cohendet and Llerena, 2003; Nooteboom, 1992, 
2009: 21; Becker, 2004; Teece and Pisano, 1994. 
“contractual men” (what I call ‘individualistic behaviour’), and consequently that cooperation is 
achieved only by rearranging the opportunities and incentives facing individuals (e.g. Williamson, 
1985, Chapter 2). This ‘surface-level cooperation’ is insufficient when it comes to non-tradable 
knowledge, which, unlike tradable information, cannot be assigned property rights or monetary 
value10 (Osterloh and Frey, 2000; Teece and Pisano, 1994: 539). Although this is most obvious in 
cases requiring initiative, teamwork, and innovation, even the most ‘deskilled’ tasks contain “some 
residual element of discretion” that cannot be efficiently contracted or monitored (Fox, 1974: 19-20, 
149; Bendix, 1963: 241). This is evidenced by the fact that strict obedience to contracts (‘work-to-
rule’) is a form of industrial sabotage (Crozier, 1964: 189). Thus, if the firm exists to develop and 
apply productive knowledge, its “very nature and rationale” involves achieving cooperation on a 
‘deeper level’11 (Simon, 1991: 33). The firm can therefore be defined as a social institution dedicated 
to production.  
 
2.3. Behaviour and Cooperation 
What, then, is this ‘deep-level’ cooperation, and how does the firm achieve it? To answer 
this question, we must first distinguish between the cognitive and relational aspects of behaviour, 
which, due to their interdependency, entail two distinct ‘behavioural modes’: as envisaged by 
contract-based theories, behaviour can be individualistic, characterised by market-like transactions 
between instrumentally-motivated individuals, but on the other hand, behaviour can also be 
solidaristic, characterised by social relationships (Blau, 1964: 91; Simmel, 1964 [1917]) between 
substantively-motivated
12
 individuals (Weber, 1978 [1922]: 85-6). This duality is evident in the work 
of Adam Smith, who, despite referring repeatedly in The Wealth of Nations to “a certain propensity 
in human nature… to truck, barter, and exchange” and assuming that “the butcher, the brewer, 
[and] the baker” all perform their jobs out of purely instrumental motivation (1904 [1776], Book I, 
Chapter 2, paras. 1 and 2), begins The Theory of Moral Sentiments with the statement: “How selfish 
soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him 
in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing 
from it except the pleasure of seeing it” (1790 [1759], Section I.I.1). 
After establishing these behavioural modes, we can generalise that whereas surface-level 
cooperation is achieved through organisational structures (such as property rights, pay schemes, and 
monitoring systems), which constrain individualistic behaviour, deep-level cooperation is achieved 
through an organisational culture, which enables solidaristic behaviour. An organisational culture 
                                                          
10
 As Nooteboom (2009) points out, the literature on ‘communities of practice’, which attempts to explain how 
specialised knowledge is formed and disseminated, is instructive in this regard: it appreciates that cooperation 
cannot be taken for granted (as in competence-based theories), but nor can it be achieved through pre-
determined, self-interested agents (as in contract-based theories). See Brown and Duguid, 1991, 2000; 
Wenger, 1998; Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger, McDermott, and Snyder, 2002; Goffin and Koners, 2011; 
Schmidt and Hunter, 1993. 
11
 This is in contrast to Williamson’s (1996: 55) claim that that deep-level cooperation, which is “sometimes 
held to be the main purpose of economic organization, especially by noneconomists”, is “auxiliary” to the 
“core purpose” of minimising transaction costs by constraining opportunism. 
12
 Note that I am not using the phrase ‘substantive rationality’ in the same sense as Simon (1976: 130-1), who 
in fact used it to describe what I have called ‘instrumental rationality’. Simon (ibid.) contrasted his “substantive 
rationality” with “procedural rationality”, which is actually closer to my usage of the phrase. 
can be defined as a set of cognitive frames and social norms shared across the organisation (March 
and Simon, 1958: 129). In particular, the firm must cultivate a cognitive frame of organisational 
loyalty, such that individuals identify with the firm to the point of subordinating their immediate 
interests to the goals of the firm and “accept[ing]…responsibilities beyond any specific contracted 
function” (Parson and Smelser, 1956: 116; see also Schein, 1992; Smirchich, 1983). It must also 
cultivate a social norm of trust, such that members expect that others will act in accordance with 
organisational loyalty (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Islam and Zyphur, 2006; Deal and Kennedy, 2000). 
Just as individual behaviour involves cognitive and relational aspects, organisational structures and 
organisational culture can be respectively conceived as the cognitive and relational aspects of 
organisational behaviour. 
Organisational structures and organisational culture, however, affect behaviour in a more 
fundamental way than simply acting on whatever mode of behaviour (individualistic or solidaristic) 
happens to prevail; they also influence which mode prevails in the first place (Argyris, 1964; 
Moschandreas, 1997; Bowles, 1985). Contrary to the rationalist methodology of contract-based 
theories, individuals are not fully determined prior to any institutional realities. Rather, to deal with 
their cognitive limitations (“bounded rationality”), they rely on institutions such as the firm to 
“constitute” their behavioural foundations13 (Simon, 1957, 1991; Chang and Evans, 2005; Hodgson, 
2002; Berger and Luckmann, 1967). On the cognitive side, an emphasis on social approval and 
reputation can activate intrinsic work motivations, just as an emphasis on material rewards and 
punishments can crowd them out by propagating an instrumental perception of work (Deci, 1971, 
1975; Deci and Ryan, 1985)14. On the relational side, leaving room for job discretion can facilitate 
reciprocity that engenders norms of trust, just as minimising discretion through extensive 
specification and intensive enforcement of responsibilities can configure the employment relation to 
be a mere transaction (Akerlof, 1982; Fox, 1974). 
 
2.4. The Trade-off between Cooperation and Coordination 
Although deep-level cooperation is “the very nature and rationale of organization” (Simon, 
1991: 33), production also requires coordination, as competence-based theories have stressed. 
Furthermore, as demonstrated by game theory, it is reasonable to presume that problems of 
coordination will apply even if cooperation has already been achieved. This implies that, at least for 
advanced technologies, ‘bureaucratic’ organisational structures like complex divisions of labour and 
hierarchical management systems may be required for the purpose of coordination15, even if 
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 Contract-based theories in fact allude to this behavioural endogeneity, but only parenthetically (e.g. 
Williamson, 1975: 98-9; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 790). This is despite the fact that Williamson (1985, 
Chapter 2) assumes from the outset that “contractual man” is boundedly rational, which implies that he is not 
necessarily opportunistic (see Foss, 2003). 
14
 For meta-studies that confirm the ‘crowding out’ effect, see Rummel and Feinberg, 1988; Wiersma, 1992; 
Tang and Hall, 1995. Cameron and Pierce (1994) and Eisenberger and Cameron (1996) challenge these meta-
studies, but are rebuffed by Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999a, 1999b). 
15
 This proposition has been contested by some radical authors, such as Marglin (1974), who argues that more 
egalitarian divisions of labour and management systems would have been equally if not more efficient than 
the bureaucratic divisions of labour and management systems that characterised the factory system, even for 
the same underlying technologies. 
cooperation has been achieved on the deep-level through organisational culture (Pagano 1991: 138, 
footnote 1). 
Given the endogeneity of behaviour, however, this presents somewhat of a predicament: 
bureaucratic organisational structures, implemented for the purpose of coordination, might 
stimulate individualistic behaviour, thus undermining deep-level cooperation. Indeed, this trade-off 
may be so critical that it competes with, or at least supplements, other answers to the perennial 
question of why firms do not expand indefinitely, such as the proliferation of ‘bureaucratic costs’ 
and other sources of scale diseconomies (Coase, 1937: 394-8; Williamson, 1985, Chapter 6; 
Mahoney, 1992). As the firm expands, and as production becomes more complex, the trade-off 
becomes more acute, because coordination becomes increasingly essential while organisational 
culture becomes increasingly difficult to maintain (Kogut and Zander, 1996: 511-2; Nooteboom, 
2009: 15). The range of theoretical and empirical literatures showing that the size of the firm is 
correlated with either the degree of worker alienation (e.g. Blauner, 1964, Indik, 1963; Ingham, 
1970) or the fomentation of class consciousness (e.g. Phillips, 1985; Kerr and Siegel, 1954; Shorter 
and Tilly, 1974), to the neglect of organisational trust and loyalty, are germane. 
 
2.5. Cultural Contingency and Structural Consistency 
To more clearly understand the cooperation/coordination trade-off requires a more 
nuanced model of how organisational structures and organisational culture influence behaviour than 
the one proposed in Section 2.3. First of all, the behavioural impact of organisational structures is 
mediated by organisational culture. As Durkheim (1893) argued in relation to his seminal theory of 
“anomie”, and as empirical work in economics and social psychology has confirmed (see Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2008), what matters for behaviour is not whether a certain organisational structure 
prevails, but how it is interpreted by workers with respect to the goals and relations they share with 
the firm. The adverse behavioural effects of bureaucratic organisational structures can therefore be 
averted with the appropriate organisational culture. This possibility is borne out in Japanese firms, 
which appear to enjoy the benefits of bureaucratic organisational structures like complex divisions 
of labour and hierarchical management systems in terms of coordination while also featuring a 
remarkable degree of deep-level cooperation (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990; Gjerding, 1992; Aoki, 
1990). This feat has clearly been made possible by an organisational culture that emphasises loyalty 
and conformity, regularly expressed in symbols and rituals (Rohlen, 1974).  
The notion of ‘cultural contingency’ has led some authors, most famously Hofstede (2001), 
to take an essentially culturalist stance, maintaining that the behavioural impact of any given 
organisational structure is determined by exogenous cultural traits (e.g. Vroom, 1964; Blood and 
Hulin, 1967; Turner and Lawrence, 1965), a proposition which appears to find some empirical 
support (Gallie, 1978; Maurice, Sorge, and Warner, 1980; Brossard and Maurice, 1976). The 
remarkable organisational culture of Japanese firms, for example, has been attributed to the unique 
features of Japanese culture, such as the high value placed on loyalty by its unique variety of 
Confucianism (e.g. Abegglen, 1958; Nakane, 1970; Morishima, 1982). However, while organisational 
culture mediates the behavioural impact of organisational structures, it must also be grounded in 
organisational structures, because individuals will not espouse a cognitive frame or relational norm if 
it is inconsistent with their everyday experience16 (Kogut and Zander, 1996). Chang (2008, Chapter 9) 
has therefore shown that the trait of loyalty only became apparent in Japanese society after 
organisational structures like welfare services and lifetime employment were introduced. By 
corroborating the notion of the firm as a family, these organisational structures offset, and perhaps 
even reverse, the adverse behavioural effects of bureaucratic organisational structures. In fact, 
Japanese firms go further by altering those structures themselves: job rotation and work groups are 
added to the division of labour (Gjerding, 1992: 106; Aoki, 1990), while managerial hierarchies are 
based on seniority (‘nenko’) and compressed in remunerative terms (Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990: 95; 
Clark, 1979; Cole, 1971, 1979). That the organisational structures of Japanese firms substantiate 
their envied organisational culture is corroborated by the fact that they have been adopted across 
the globe, even amidst cultures that would appear unfavourable to such a system (Dore, 1973; 
Gjerding, 1992).  
Following the thesis of an assortment of Marxian and Weberian commentators (e.g. 
Edwards, 1979; Edwards, Gordon, and Reich, 1975; Burawoy, 1983), not to mention the work of 
authors such as Bourdieu, Foucault, and Gramsci, critics of Japanese firms consider these distinctive 
organisational structures to represent a means of “bureaucratic control”, whereby managers 
legitimise their position vis-à-vis workers by distracting attention from the real distribution of 
power17 (e.g. Grenier, 198818). In reality, however, the requirement of structural consistency creates 
somewhat of a ‘distributive dilemma’ for power-holders, who may be required to revise the very 
organisational structures that sustain their power – namely the division of labour, the management 
system, and the structure of ownership and control – in order to achieve deep-level cooperation. 
Although cultural manipulation can partially alleviate this dilemma, the fates of managerial 
ideologies throughout the ages show that, ultimately, managers cannot have their cake (deep-level 
cooperation) and eat it too (by retaining power) (Fox, 1974). Indeed, numerous commentators agree 
that Japanese firms are in effect run in the interests of their workers, pointing to their participatory 
system of decision-making (‘ringi’) and their sophisticated bonus system (e.g. Aoki, 1988, Chapter 5; 
1990: 14-22; Yoshino, 1971; Vogel, 1975; Urabe, Child, and Kagono, 1988). This power constraint 
may explain why international implementations of Japanese-style quality circles generally failed to 
elicit the type of behaviour observed in Japan – they permitted only informal suggestions rather than 
real participation in decision-making, with managers retaining ultimate control (Hill, 1986; Bradley 
and Hill, 1987; Fucini and Fucini, 1990). 
 
3. Worker Cooperatives Reconsidered 
3.1. Managerial Hierarchies and Cooperatives 
The ‘social’ theory of the firm proposed in Section 2.1 can be expediently applied to 
cooperative firms, which both of the predominant schools have generally dismissed as inefficient. In 
particular, both schools emphasise the importance of hierarchical management systems, which they 
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 Geertz (1973) analogously argued that “cultural systems” must always be rooted in “social systems”. 
17
 Indeed, given the influence of Japanese work practices in Western countries, the ‘critical management’ 
literature can be seen as an extension of this criticism (e.g. Willmott, 1993; Knights and Willmott, 1987, 1989; 
Parker, 2002). 
18
 See also Rinehart, Huxley, and Robinson, 1997; Parker and Slaughter, 1988; Hanappi-Egger, 1996. 
associate with the capitalist firm. However, they diverge in a subtle yet consequential way over 
precisely why managerial hierarchies are required, and why they are associated with the capitalist 
firm. 
Contract-based theories maintain that managerial hierarchies are required to achieve 
surface-level cooperation by constraining the opportunistic behaviour that would otherwise result 
from a complex division of labour. First, managers can monitor, reward, and punish workers, who 
would otherwise free-ride on each other’s efforts (“shirk”) due to the asymmetries of information 
inherent in joint labour (“team production”) (Williamson, 1975; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; 
Holmstrom, 1982). Second, managers can authoritatively make investment decisions that would 
otherwise be subject to inefficient rent-seeking (“hold-up”) due to the inextricability of assets from 
the production process (“asset specificity”) (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Klein, 
Crawford, and Alchian, 1978)19. Competence-based theories, on the other hand, maintain that 
managerial hierarchies are required to achieve the coordination that would otherwise be lacking in a 
complex division of labour. In particular, by facilitating specialisation in the management function, 
managerial hierarchies can efficiently control the flow of information and the allocation of skills and 
resources between stages of production, taking into account risk, uncertainty, and change (Chandler, 
1977, 1990; Chandler and Daems, 1981; Simon, 1962; Knight, 1921). They can also provide symbolic 
leadership in order to ensure that deep-level cooperation is channelled productively (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982). 
Chandler and Williamson, perhaps the most outspoken advocates of the capitalist firm in 
their respective schools, both downplay the distinction between the contract-based and 
competence-based rationales for managerial hierarchy, even to the point of citing each other 
(Chandler, 1992; Chandler and Daems, 1981: 217; Williamson, 1985, Chapter 11). According to the 
theory outlined above however, the rival justifications of managerial hierarchy are not merely ‘two 
sides of the same coin’. Although they may overlap, with certain organisational structures and 
organisational cultures purporting to achieve both, cooperation and coordination are separate 
objectives, with distinct implications for organisation20.  
Turning firstly to contract-based theories, the case for managerial hierarchy based on 
surface-level cooperation leads almost axiomatically to the conclusion that workers cannot 
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 Although contract-based theories that focus on cooperation problems in investment rather than work do 
not explicitly mention managerial hierarchies, they can still be interpreted as assuming that managerial 
hierarchies are required to achieve surface-level cooperation because they essentially envisage a ‘classical’ 
firm whereby ownership and management are indistinct. According to Grossman, Hart, and Moore, for 
instance, the hold-up problem can be mitigated by granting “residual rights of control” to one of the parties, 
who will then hire the other party’s assets. These control rights are “residual” because they authorise their 
owner to control the use of the other party’s asset beyond any contractual obligations. They are therefore 
equivalent to what Coase (1937) called “direction”, which he equated with managerial hierarchy. The same 
qualification applies to the neoclassical literature on the ‘Labour-Managed Firm’ – note that, although they 
compare capital- and labour-owned firms, they nevertheless label their representative firms as capital- and 
labour-managed. 
20
 Indeed, despite his lip-service to Chandler’s account, Williamson’s (1975, 1985) dismissal of egalitarian work 
modes is fully predicated on their alleged inability to achieve surface-level cooperation: in his analysis, they 
perform proficiently on dimensions of “product flow” and “assignment”, which essentially refer to the 
coordination of production, falling short only in the category of “incentives”, including shirking, equipment 
maintenance, and investment. Contrariwise, although Chandler mentions Williamson’s transaction-cost 
arguments, they are in no way necessary for his story of coordination to remain coherent. 
own/control the firm, because non-worker ownership/control is an intrinsic part of how managerial 
hierarchies are supposed to achieve cooperation (see Jensen and Meckling, 1979). Indeed, Coase 
(1937) equated managerial hierarchies (which he saw as the defining feature of the firm in general) 
with the capitalist firm. For instance, the most efficient way to incentivise managers to monitor 
workers is to award them the property rights to the ‘residual’, which represents the product left 
over after all individually contractible returns have been paid (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Barzel, 
1987). Workers, however, could not be thus incentivised, because they would merely free-ride on 
each other’s monitoring in addition to their work. Likewise, worker-owners could not efficiently 
implement rewards and punishments on themselves, because ex-post they would always have an 
incentive not to incur debt or to waste output (“break the budget”), which may be required for an 
optimal incentive scheme (Holmstrom, 1982). Meanwhile, a series of models based on the ‘Labour-
Managed Firm’ have asserted that worker-ownership incurs a range of perverse investment 
incentives due to the bundling of wealth and work21 (see Bonin and Putterman, 2001). What makes 
ownership by capital efficient in these models is precisely that non-workers, whose wealth is not tied 
up in their job, make investment decisions – in other words, that investment decisions are made 
through managerial hierarchies.  
 Is the contract-based rationale for managerial hierarchy valid? On the one hand, the notion 
that managerial hierarchies (coupled with capitalist ownership) are required to achieve surface-level 
cooperation can be disputed on the grounds that cooperatives may be able to attain surface-level 
cooperation without managerial hierarchies. For instance, worker-management may entail less 
asymmetry of information and costs of bureaucracy than hierarchical management (e.g. Aoki, 1984; 
Fitzroy and Kraft, 1986; Putterman, 1984), while worker-ownership may entail superior incentives 
for work and investment than non-worker ownership (e.g. Eswaran and Kotwal, 1984; Blinder, 1990; 
Matrix Evidence, 2010). More important, however, is the assumption that individualistic behaviour 
prevails universally and unconditionally, and therefore that cooperation is achieved only on the 
surface level. In reality, managerial hierarchies may induce (or at least reinforce) that very 
behaviour, precluding the solidaristic behaviour that enables deep-level cooperation22 (see Section 
2.1.3). In any case, due to the distributive dilemma, capitalist firms will be severely limited in 
substantiating an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation, and may therefore rely on 
managerial hierarchies to achieve surface-level cooperation (e.g. Marglin, 1974; Braverman, 1974). 
By contrast, non-hierarchical management and worker ownership/control may not only 
contribute to solidaristic behaviour and deep-level cooperation directly, but also allow decision-
makers (namely worker-members) to enjoy the productive benefits of deep-level cooperation. 
Indeed, numerous studies have found higher levels of trust and loyalty in cooperatives than in 
comparable capitalist firms (Frohlich et al., 1998; Estrin, Jones, and Svejnar, 1987; Gherardi and 
Masiero, 1990). Crucially, the incidence of deep-level cooperation precludes the need for managerial 
hierarchies to achieve surface-level cooperation (Valentinov, 2004). Indeed, worker-owned and -
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 For instance, worker-owners may be reluctant to expand membership because doing so would dilute the 
value of their shares; they may shun capital-intensive investments that threaten their jobs; they may behave 
risk-aversely due to their wealth being undiversified; or they may refuse to make investments that are only 
expected to yield returns after they have retired. 
22
 That this behavioural effect is mediated by organisational culture is a moot point in this case, because an 
organisational culture achieving deep-level cooperation would obviate the need for managerial hierarchies to 
achieve surface-level cooperation in the first place. 
managed firms have been empirically shown to feature less managerial supervision than traditional 
firms, in part due to the prevalence of ‘mutual monitoring’23 (Russell 1985; Weitzman and Kruse, 
1990; Bonin, Jones, and Putterman, 1993).  
If the contract-based rationale for managerial hierarchy is unfounded, what about the 
competence-based rationale? Some radical authors dispute the notion that managerial hierarchies 
are required to coordinate production, contending that less complex divisions of labour, 
accompanied by less hierarchical management systems, are feasible for any given technology 
(Marglin, 1974). They further contend that ‘de-skilled’ divisions of labour are not more productive, 
prevailing only because they justify the role of managers (Braverman, 1974). However, while 
maximally partitioned divisions of labour are likely to be inefficient, as Adam Smith (1776) himself 
acknowledged (for instance, because they stifle teamwork, learning, and innovation), some degree 
of specialisation – and thus managerial hierarchy – is likely to be required for coordination, as 
mentioned above. 
Unlike the contract-based rationale for managerial hierarchy, however, the competence-
based rationale does not disqualify the cooperative firm. Indeed, Chandler appears to associate 
managerial hierarchies with the capitalist firm merely due to historical happenstance24 (see also 
Langlois, 2007). It may be assumed that cooperatives are precluded from implementing complex 
divisions of labour and managerial hierarchies because they espouse egalitarian principles. However, 
ownership and control by labour does not necessarily entail functional equivalence or equal pay 
among the workforce; it is possible in theory, and common in practice, for worker-owners to 
democratically consent to complex divisions of labour and to elect managers to coordinate that 
division of labour if they perceive (net) economic benefits of doing so25 (Ben-Ner and Jones, 1995; 
Russell, 1985; Vogt, 1996: 40-1). Such managers would exercise only delegated (or “formal”) rather 
than ultimate (or “real”) authority (Aghion and Tirole, 1997); as envisaged by competence-based 
theories, they would essentially be just another cog in the division of labour (Knight, 1921; Langlois 
and Cosgel, 1993). 
In fact, when deep-level cooperation is considered, worker-owned firms may be more 
propitiously situated to implement managerial hierarchies (along with complex divisions of labour) 
for the sake of achieving coordination than conventional firms. As explained in Section 2.4, a 
potential trade-off exists between coordination and deep-level cooperation, which can be alleviated 
by an organisational culture that tolerates bureaucratic organisational structures. However, that 
organisational must still be substantiated in organisational structures; and if the division and labour 
and the management system must be bureaucratic for the purpose of coordination, structural 
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 Jensen and Meckling (1979: 485) point out that mutual monitoring entails a collective action problem in 
itself. This, however, is precisely the point. Workers will only monitor each other if they are substantively 
motivated to do so (due to loyalty to the firm), and if they expect enough of their co-workers to do so (due to 
trust) – that is, if deep-level cooperation prevails. 
24
 Although he does point out that innovations in steam power and electricity required exceptionally capital-
intensive forms of production, this is an explanation for why capitalists rather than workers do own/control 
the firm, not why they should – unless, of course, one takes a contract-based perspective. 
25
 If it seems unfeasible for workers to elect managers without sacrificing ultimate control, consider that 
shareholders in capitalist corporations essentially do the same – although managers are delegated with the 
authority to initiate and implement decisions (“decision management”), shareholders nevertheless retain the 
authority to ratify and monitor decisions (“decision control”) (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
consistency must be achieved in the realm of ownership and control – that is, the system of 
governance. The distributive dilemma will therefore prevent capitalist firms from overcoming the 
cooperation/coordination trade-off, as any managerial hierarchies they implement for the purpose 
of coordination are likely to stimulate individualistic behaviour, thus bringing to fruition the need for 
hierarchy to achieve surface-level cooperation. This is perhaps why Williamson and Chandler, who 
primarily analyse the capitalist firm, seem to believe that their competing rationales are merely 
expressing two sides of the same coin – in capitalist firms, the coordination and cooperation roles of 
managerial hierarchies are indeed inseparable. 
Cooperatives, by contrast, do not face the distributive dilemma, and so contain the potential 
to mitigate the cooperation/coordination trade-off by separating the dual functions of managerial 
hierarchy: with deep-level cooperation achieved through participation in governance, coordination 
can be achieved through managerial hierarchies in the workplace26 (Fox, 1974, Chapter 2; Kaswan, 
2013; Pateman 1970: 69-7227). Furthermore, because managers are elected by workers (they are 
“representative”) and do not purport to achieve cooperation but only coordination (they are not 
“punishment-centred”), their adverse behavioural effects are likely to be diminished (Gouldner, 
1954); as Marx (1959 [1894], Chapter 23, para. 48) recognised, “In a co-operative factory the 
antagonistic nature of the labour of supervision disappears, because the manager is paid by the 
labourers instead of representing capital counterposed to them.”28 
The Mondragón group of cooperatives in the Basque country is perhaps the foremost 
example of combining worker ownership and control with complex divisions of labour and 
hierarchical management systems29. It is clear that Mondragón has achieved coordination, as 
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  Indeed, Ouchi (1980) argued that because some organisations (what he called “clans”) achieve coordination 
through managerial hierarchies but rely on other organisational structures (in this case the governance 
system) to achieve deep-level cooperation, Williamson’s (1975) dichotomy between “markets and hierarchy” 
was incomplete. 
27
 Pateman argued that “full participation” in governance (what she called the “high level”) could significantly 
affect democratic attitudes and abilities even when participation in the workplace (the “low level”) was only 
“partial”. 
28
 It has been claimed, most forcefully by Hansmann (1988, 1990, 1996; see also Webb, 1891; Webb and 
Webb, 1920) that worker governance is itself a source of inefficiency, not least due to the intensive and 
extensive processes that it entails. Be that as it may, I have argued that it also facilitates deep-level 
cooperation – and the preservation of this deep-level cooperation amidst bureaucratic structures in the 
workplace – in a way that is not available to firms with conventional power structures. Spear (2004) and 
Cornforth (2004), meanwhile, have outlined the agency problems associated with maintaining hierarchical 
management systems in member-based firms, including a smaller skill-based from which to elect board 
representatives; a multiplicity of organisational goals, including non-quantifiable ones, by which to evaluate 
managerial performance; and a lack of disciplinary pressure from stock and managerial markets. However, 
these problems are largely a symptom of a hostile institutional environment, and can therefore be addressed 
through institutional innovations such as the inter-cooperative associations discussed in Section 3.2. In any 
case, there are also reasons why worker control may more effectively deal with managerial agency problems 
than capitalist control. Whereas capitalist owners must judge the quality of management from afar, and 
anyway have little incentive to monitor managers if shareholding is liquid and dispersed , workers are in daily, 
face-to-face contact with managers and, given the bundling of their wealth and their job, have a strong 
interest in ensuring that managers perform  (Putterman, 1984). At any rate, managers may themselves be 
influenced by the firm’s organisational culture and so behave solidaristically, as Spear (2004: 46) 
acknowledges. 
29
 In large part, this is a reflection of the founder, Don Jose María Arizmendiarrieta, who had a remarkable 
appreciation for the competence-based rationale for managerial hierarchies (MacLeod, 2000: 70-4, 84-7; 
evidenced by its vast size (it was the seventh-largest company in Spain in 2012; Mondragón 
Corporation, 2012); its high quality of management relative to conventional firms operating in the 
same sectors (Abando, Gallartegi, and Rodriguez, 2007); its operation in a multiplicity of sectors; and 
its exceptional capacity for innovation (Lopez, Lopez, and Larrañaga, 2009: 51; Bakaikoa, Agirre, and 
Errasti, 2008). Surveys published by Bradley and Gelb in 1981 showed that the Mondragón 
cooperatives had also achieved deep-level cooperation, as workers reported greater levels of job 
control, participation, and work motivation; identified more strongly with their firm; and maintained 
higher-trust and more consensual relationships with their colleagues and managers than workers in 
capitalist firms with similar divisions of labour and management systems. As with Japanese firms, 
many observers of Mondragón have attributed this feat to the exceptionally solidaristic features of 
Basque culture (e.g. Logan, 1979; Hansmann, 1996, Chapter 6; Oakeshott et al., 1977). Following the 
argument of this section, however, it would appear that Mondragón has in fact “created as 
distinctive organizational culture” (Whyte and Whyte, 1988: 281, emphasis in original) through its 
systems of cooperative governance (Greenwood and Gonzalez Santos, 1992: 154). 
The ability of cooperatives to transcend the cooperation/coordination trade-off by avoiding 
the distributive dilemma is perhaps why Marx, other radicals, and even the unionist movement have 
historically maintained an ambivalent attitude towards them (e.g. Marx, 1970 [1875]). On the one 
hand, cooperatives represent a feasible way of managing complex production processes without 
capitalist employers30 (Egan, 1990). On the other hand, as an inherent contradiction of capitalism, 
the distributive dilemma is implicated in the development of class consciousness. By overcoming it, 
and potentially eliminating class distinction within the enterprise altogether, cooperatives may 
therefore impede the revolution, for instance displacing the role of trade unions. Indeed, if workers 
elect managerial hierarchies and consent to alienating workplaces, all the while espousing an 
organisational culture of deep-level cooperation, they may essentially be engaging in ‘self-
exploitation’ by acting “as their own capitalists”31 (Jossa, 2005: 14), thus “reproduc[ing]…all the 
shortcomings of the prevailing system” (Marx, 1959 [1894]: 431) – a system that, it should not be 
forgotten, Marx admired for its productive capacity. Not surprisingly, all of these criticisms have 
been directed towards Mondragón (Kasmir, 1996). In short, both the praise and the scorn that 
Marxists have directed towards cooperatives demonstrate their productive power. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Azurmendi, 1985: 421; Whyte and Whyte, 1988: 253, 257). Indeed, Arizmendiarrieta reckoned that democratic 
governance would allow cooperatives to implement managerial hierarchies and complex divisions of labour 
while maintaining deep-level cooperation, thus affording “all the means available to capitalistic corporations 
plus the added moral force of cooperative principles” (MacLeod, 2000: 85). In this manner, he believed that 
cooperatives could not only compete with capitalist firms, but also surpass them, particularly through their 
superior flexibility in adapting to shifts in technology (ibid.: 88). 
30
 In his inaugural address to the First International, for example, Marx (1864, para. 13, emphasis added) stated 
that cooperatives “have shown that production on a large scale, and in accord with the behests of modern 
science, may be carried on without the existence of a class of masters employing a class of hands…and that, 
like slave labor, like serf labor, hired labor is but a transitory and inferior form, destined to disappear before 
associated labour…”. He therefore considered cooperatives to be a “transforming force” (1867, Section 5, 
para. 2) in that they “represent within the old form the first sprouts of the new” (1959 [1894], Chapter 27, 
para. 17). Engles (1989 [1880]: 43) likewise opined that cooperatives have “given practical proof that the 
merchant and the manufacturer are socially quite unnecessary”. 
31
 See also Paranque and Willmott, 2014. 
3.2. Explaining the Infrequency of Cooperatives 
If cooperatives indeed possess a unique advantage in implementing bureaucratic 
organisational structures, as I have suggested, the question arises as to why they are conspicuously 
rare in sectors requiring complex divisions of labour and hierarchical management systems (Ben-Ner, 
1988a; Dow, 2003; World Co-operative Monitor, 2013), having been concentrated in agriculture and 
non-standardised services since their emergence in the nineteenth century (Zamagni, 2014: 197-8; 
Shaffer 1999). Indeed, as a cooperative organisation that operates in large-scale manufacturing 
industries, Mondragón is remarkably atypical. A plausible answer is that prevailing institutional 
environments are generally geared to the prevailing capitalist mode of organisation, thus militating 
against cooperatives and suppressing their ability to overcome the cooperation/coordination trade-
off (Putterman, 1982; Pagano and Rowthorn, 1996; Everett and Minkler, 1993). Following DiMaggio 
and Powell’s (1983) famous article, I would suggest that this sort of “institutional isomorphism” 
generally operates through the two aspects of behaviour discussed in Section 2.3: the structural or 
relational aspect, which affects the options available to individuals, and the cultural or cognitive 
aspect, which affects the way those options are perceived. 
Considering firstly the structural/relational aspect, it has been widely noted that prevailing 
institutions of finance, law, education, and so on, along with the very frequency of capitalist firms 
that they support, bias opportunities and incentives against the formation and success of 
cooperatives (see Webb, 1891; Webb and Webb, 1920). For example, entrepreneurs may be unable 
to procure finance to start a coop, and could anyway reap greater material rewards by starting a 
conventional firm (Smith and Rothbaum, 2014: 222; Weitzman, 1984; Podivinsky and Stewart, 2012); 
cooperatives may struggle to find managers who are capable of working in a democratic firm, and 
those managers that are eligible will be deterred by the relatively lower managerial pay and 
autonomy that they offer (Chaves and Sajardo, 2004; Davis, 2001; Spear, 2004); and workers may 
face severe risks by bundling their wealth with their job, and would anyway be tempted to hire non-
members or sell their shares to investors (e.g. Ben-Ner 1984, 1988b; Miyazaki, 1984; Vanek, 1977).  
 The cultural/cognitive aspect, however, is equally critical. Although we saw in Section 2.5 
that organisational culture is not fully determined by exogenous cultural traits but rather rooted in 
organisational structures, isolated cooperatives must vie with the host of “pervasive behavior-
shaping institutions” (Rothschild and Whitt, 1986: 67) that propagate an instrumental/transactional 
approach to work (Pateman, 1970; Blumberg, 1973; Kanter, 1977). This may not only prevent 
individuals from forming, managing, or working in cooperatives (which they may not even consider 
in the first place, as the prevailing institutional environment generates a self-reinforcing sense of 
normality and legitimacy; see Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Everett and Minkler, 1993; Kanter, 1972: 152-
4), but also force cooperatives into an uphill battle of structural consistency. Indeed, “value-based 
organisations” have been widely reported to struggle with a kind of ‘cultural degeneration’, 
especially as their ideologically-motivated founding members pass the mantle to the next generation 
(Bruni and Smerilli, 2014; see also Zald and Ash, 1966; Rothschild and Whitt, 1986: 67, 128).  
The challenge of achieving structural consistency amidst an institutional environment based 
on capitalist organisation will be even more challenging for cooperatives if they attempt to 
implement bureaucratic organisational structures that are normally associated with capitalist firms, 
even if only for the purpose of achieving coordination. Bureaucracy and democracy are not 
inherently incompatible, as has been repeatedly shown to be true within cooperatives32. However, if 
the day-to-day experience of worker-members (and managers) is no different from that of 
employees (and managers) in conventional firms, abstract notions of equality and participation 
substantiated by occasional exercise of voting rights are unlikely to significantly influence their 
workplace behaviour. Furthermore, a lack of participation in the workplace could initiate a vicious 
circle that ‘spills over’ into the realm of governance, as worker-members may become inexperienced 
and apathetic with regard to democratic processes and increasingly concerned with pecuniary 
criteria (Ben-Ner, 1984). Managers, meanwhile, may come to be seen as deserving special 
membership status (Meister, 1984). In what Weber (1930 [1905] termed the “iron cage” and what 
his apprentice Michels (1962 [1911]) termed the “iron law of oligarchy”, bureaucracy could thus 
expand to the point of effecting “a fundamental change in the authority structure” (Rothschild and 
Whitt 1986: 113)33. In line with the argument of Section 2.4, Weber and Michels also predicted that 
these obstacles to alleviating the cooperation/coordination trade-off would intensify as the firm 
expands (see Jones and Kalmi, 2012). Indeed, problems of structural consistency (Whyte and Whyte, 
1988, Chapters 9-11; Greenwood and Gonzalez Santos, 1992; Heras-Saizarbitoria, 2014) and 
bureaucratisation (Bakaikoa, Errasti, and Begiristain, 2004; Cheney, 1999; Storey, Basterretxea, and 
Salaman 2014) have afflicted Mondragón throughout its rise to prominence. 
 It has been widely noted that inter-cooperative associations such as the Mondragón group 
can help alleviate the structural aspect of institutional isomorphism by substituting for mainstream 
institutions, for instance by providing finance and management training and by redistributing 
personnel and resources (e.g. Ellerman 1982; Gui, 1984; Basterretxea and Albizu, 2010, 2011; 
Archibald and Neary, 1983). The cultural aspect provides an additional rationale: inter-cooperative 
associations may not only contribute to deep-level cooperation directly by providing a common 
cultural environment (Sacchetti and Tortia, forthcoming), but may also allow individual cooperatives 
to more effectively pursue deep-level cooperation by alleviating the burden of coordination. This 
was most apparent in Mondragón’s early days, when the ‘Entrepreneurial’ or ‘Business Division’ 
(Division Empresarial) of the cooperative bank (Caja Laboral Popular) assumed the role of not only 
creating and nurturing new coops, but also coordinating the strategies of existing ones (Whyte and 
Whyte, 1988, Chapter 8). A particularly relevant policy was to subdivide member cooperatives once 
they reached some pre-determined maximum size (five-hundred members was the historical 
benchmark) in order to preserve an organisational culture of deep-level cooperation. The cultural 
aspect also sheds light on why such associations are not more common: not only might they 
encounter structural obstacles, as no individual cooperative has an incentive to create them and 
may anyway be incapable of doing so without some critical number cooperatives already in 
existence (Joshi and Smith, 2008; Smith and Rothbaum, 2014: 236; Dow and Putterman, 1996: 67-
70), they may also encounter cultural obstacles, as they may require ‘deep-level inter-cooperation’ if 
individual cooperatives are to voluntarily cede autonomy. 
 
4. Conclusions 
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 See Varman and Chakrabarti, 2004; Batstone, 1983; Cornforth, 1995; Cornforth et al., 1988; Estrin and Jones, 
1992; Hernandez, 2006; Stryjan, 1994; Storey, Basterretxea, and Salaman, 2014. 
33
 This problem is also evident in capitalist corporations that separate ownership and management. See Berle 
and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983. 
This paper firstly argued that the predominant economic theories of the firm neglect the 
importance of cooperation based on trust and loyalty. While competence-based theories fail to 
acknowledge that the development and application of productive knowledge requires cooperation, 
contract-based theories cling to a rigid model of behaviour that does not account for the type of 
cooperation based on trust and loyalty thus required. In the ‘social’ theory of the firm subsequently 
proposed, the paper suggested that this ‘deep-level cooperation’ may be jeopardised by the 
bureaucratic organisational structures that are required in order to achieve coordination. Although 
this effect can be mitigated by an appropriate organisational culture, that organisational culture 
must be substantiated in organisational structures. A ‘distributive dilemma’ thus arises whereby 
power-holders may be required to reform the very organisational structures on which their power is 
predicated in order to achieve deep-level cooperation. By appreciating the importance of 
cooperation based on trust and loyalty, this theory of the firm not only improves on but also unifies 
the two predominant schools. 
The paper secondly reconsidered the criticisms levelled against cooperatives by the 
predominant theories of the firm in light of this theory. Although contract-based theories denigrate 
cooperatives for failing to achieve cooperation, cooperatives may in fact be better positioned than 
conventional firms to achieve deep-level cooperation, in which the organisational structures thus 
required are likely to threaten power-holders. Meanwhile, although competence-based theories 
imply that cooperatives are incapable of coordinating complex production processes, cooperatives 
may in fact be more propitiously situated than conventional firms to implement the bureaucratic 
organisational structures required to achieve coordination without incurring their adverse 
behavioural effects on cooperation, because worker control can counteract their adverse 
behavioural effects. In short, cooperatives may have a unique advantage both in achieving deep-
level cooperation and in maintaining deep-level cooperation alongside the bureaucratic 
organisational structures required for coordination. This advantage, however, may be suppressed by 
a hostile institutional environment, which biases both the options available to individuals and the 
way they perceive those options against cooperatives. Inter-cooperative associations can resist this 
institutional bias, but face their own structural and cultural obstacles. 
This is by no means a standard argument. Support for cooperatives from academics, 
laypeople, and politicians tends to rely either on the notion that workplaces can be dramatically 
reformed without sacrificing efficiency or on the belief that a sacrifice in efficiency is the price to pay 
for a more ‘humane’ economy and society; the underlying assumption in either case is that 
cooperatives will thrive if and only if bureaucracy is abolished (see Rothschild and Whitt, 1986). 
Although the theory outlined in this paper suggests that cooperatives will indeed have an advantage 
in achieving trust and loyalty when complex divisions of labour and hierarchical management 
systems are not required, its main implication is that cooperatives may in fact have an advantage in 
implementing complex divisions of labour and hierarchical management systems. 
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